far, both from a shareholder perspective and that of the financial system as a whole.
A Simple Strategic Schematic
Exhibit 2 is a depiction of the market for financial services as a matrix of clients, products and geographies. [Walter, 1988] Financial firms clearly will want to allocate available financial, human and technological resources to those cells (market segments) in the matrix that promise to throw-off the highest risk-adjusted returns. 1 In order to do this, they will have to appropriately attribute costs, returns and risks to specific cells in the matrix. And the cells themselves have to be linked-together in a way that maximizes what practitioners and analysts commonly call "synergies."
• Client-driven linkages exist when a financial institution serving a particular client or client-group can, as a result, supply financial services either to the same client or to another client in the same group more efficiently in the same or different geographies. Risk-mitigation results from spreading exposures across clients, along with greater earnings stability to the extent that income streams from different clients or client-segments are not perfectly correlated.
• Product-driven linkages exist when an institution can supply a particular financial service in a more competitive manner because it is already producing the same or a similar financial service in different client or arena dimensions. Here again, there is risk mitigation to the extent that net revenue streams from different products are not perfectly correlated.
• Geographic linkages are important when an institution can service a particular client or supply a particular service more efficiently in one geography as a result of having an active presence in another geography. Once more, the risk profile of the firm may be improved to the extent that business is spread across different currencies, macroeconomic and interest-rate environments.
To extract maximum returns from the market matrix, firms need to understand the competitive dynamics of specific segments as well as, the costs -including acquisition and integration costs in the case of M&A initiatives -and the risks imbedded in the overall portfolio of activities. Especially challenging is the task of optimizing the linkages between the cells to maximize potential joint cost and revenue economies, as discussed below. Firms that do this well can be considered to have a high degree of "strategic integrity" and should have a market capitalization that exceeds their standalone value of their constituent businesses.
So is bigger and broader better in the financial services industry? If so, why? And what is the evidence? Here we shall consider each of the major arguments, pro and con.
Economies and Diseconomies of Scale
Whether economies or diseconomies of scale exist in financial services has been at the heart of strategic and regulatory discussions about optimum firm size in the financial services industry. Are larger firms associated with increased scale economies and hence profitability and shareholder value? Can increased average size of firms create a more efficient financial sector? Answers are not easy to find, because they have to isolate the impact of pure size of the production unit as a whole from all of the other revenue and cost impacts of size, discussed below.
In an information-and transactions-intensive industry with frequently high fixed costs such as financial services, there should be ample potential for scale economies.
However, the potential for diseconomies of scale attributable to disproportionate increases in administrative overhead, management of complexity, agency problems and other cost factors could also occur in very large financial services firms. If economies of scale prevail, increased size will help create financial efficiency and shareholder value.
If diseconomies prevail, both will be destroyed. Scale-effects should be directly observable in cost functions of financial services firms and in aggregate performance measures.
Many studies of economies of scale have been undertaken in the banking, insurance and securities industries over the years --see Saunders [2000] for a survey.
Unfortunately, examinations of both scale and scope economies in financial services are unusually problematic. The nature of the empirical tests used, the form of the cost functions, the existence of unique optimum output levels, and the optimizing behavior of 4 financial firms all present difficulties. Limited availability and conformity of data present serious empirical issues. And the conclusions of any study that has detected (or failed to detect) economies of scale and/or scope in a sample of financial institutions does not necessarily have general applicability. Nevertheless, the impact on the operating economics (production functions) of financial firms is so important that available empirical evidence is central to the whole argument.
Estimated cost functions form the basis most of the available empirical tests.
Virtually all of them have found that economies of scale are achieved with increases in size among small commercial banks (below $100 million in asset size). A few studies have shown that scale economies may also exist in banks falling into the $100 million to $5 billion range. There is very little evidence so far of scale economies in the case of banks larger than $5 billion. More recently, there is some scattered evidence of scalerelated cost gains for banks up to $25 billion in asset size. [Berger and Mester, 1997] But according to a survey of all empirical studies of economies of scale through 1998, there was no evidence of such economies among very large banks. Berger, Demsetz and Strahan [1998] and Berger, Hunter, and Timme [1993] found the relationship between size and average cost to be U-shaped. This suggests that small banks can benefit from economies of scale, but that large banks seem to suffer from diseconomies of scale, resulting in higher average costs as they increase in size. The consensus seems to be that scale economies and diseconomies generally do not result in more than about 5% difference in unit costs. Inability to find major economies of scale among large financial services firms is also true of insurance companies [Cummins and Zi, 1998 ] and broker-dealers [Goldberg, Hanweck, Keenan and Young, 1991] . Lang and Wetzel [1998] found diseconomies of scale in both banking and securities services among German universal banks.
Except for the very smallest among banks and nonbank financial firms, scale economies seem likely to have relatively little bearing on competitive performance. This is particularly true since smaller institutions are sometimes linked-together in cooperatives or other structures that allow harvesting available economies of scale centrally, or are specialists in specific market-segments in Exhibit 2 that are not particularly sensitive to relatively small cost differences that seem to be associated with economies of scale in the financial services industry. A basic problem is that most of the available empirical studies focus entirely on firm-wide scale economies when the really important scale issues are encountered at the level of individual businesses.
There is ample evidence, for example, that economies of scale are significant for operating economies and competitive performance in areas such as global custody, processing of mass-market credit card transactions and institutional asset management.
Economies of scale may be far less important in other areas such as private banking and M&A advisory services. Unfortunately, empirical data on cost functions that would permit identification of economies of scale at the product level are generally proprietary, and therefore unavailable. Disturbingly, it seems reasonable that a scale-driven strategy may make a great deal of sense in specific areas of financial activity even in the absence of evidence that there is very much to be gained at the firm-wide level. Still, the notion that there are some lines of activity that clearly benefit from scale economies while at the same time observations of firm-wide economies of scale are empirically elusive, suggests that there must be numerous lines of activity (or combinations) where diseconomies of scale exist.
Cost Economies of Scope
Beyond pure scale-effects, are there cost reductions to be achieved by selling a broader rather than narrower range of products? Cost economies of scope mean that the joint production of two or more products or services is accomplished more cheaply than producing them separately. "Global" scope economies become evident on the cost side when the total cost of producing all products is less than producing them individually, while "activity-specific" economies consider the joint production of particular pairs or clusters of financial services. Cost economies of scope can be harvested through the sharing of IT platforms and other overheads, information and monitoring costs, and the like. Information, for example, can be reused and thereby avoid cost duplication, facilitate creativity in developing solutions to client problems, and leverage client-specific knowledge. [Stefanadis, 2002] . On the other hand, cost diseconomies of scope may arise from such factors as inertia and lack of responsiveness and creativity that may come with increased firm breadth, complexity and bureaucratization, as well as "turf" and profit-attribution conflicts that increase costs or erode product quality in meeting client needs, or serious cultural differences across the organizational "silos" that inhibit seamless delivery of a broad range of financial services.
Like economies of scale, cost-related scope economies should be directly observable in cost functions of financial services suppliers and in aggregate performance measures. Most empirical studies have failed to find significant costeconomies of scope in the banking, insurance or securities industries [Saunders 2000 ].
They suggest that some cost-diseconomies of scope are encountered when firms in the financial services sector add new product-ranges to their portfolios. Saunders and Walter [1994] , for example, found negative cost, economies of scope among the world's 200 largest banks -as the product range widens, unit-costs seem to go up, although not dramatically so.
However, the period covered by many of these studies involve firms that were shifting away from a pure focus on banking or insurance, and may thus have incurred considerable front-end costs in expanding the range of their activities. If these outlays were expensed in accounting statements during the period under study, then one might expect to see evidence of diseconomies of scope reversed in future periods. The evidence on cost-economies of scope so far remains inconclusive.
Operating Efficiencies
Besides economies of scale and cost-economies scope, financial firms of roughly the same size and providing roughly the same range of services can have very different cost levels per unit of output. There is ample evidence that such performance differences exist, for example, in comparisons of cost-to-income ratios among banks, insurance companies, and investment firms of comparable size. The reasons involve differences in production functions reflecting, efficiency and effectiveness in the use of labor and capital, sourcing and application of available technology, and acquisition of inputs, organizational design, compensation and incentive systems -i.e., in just plain better or worse management. These are what economists call X-efficiencies.
A number of studies have found rather large disparities in cost structures among banks of similar size, suggesting that the way banks are run is more important than their size or the selection of businesses that they pursue. [Berger, Hancock and Humphrey, 1993; Berger, Hunter and Timme, 1993] The consensus of studies conducted in the United States seems to be that average unit costs in the banking industry lie some 20%
above "best practice" firms producing the same range and volume of services, with most of the difference attributable to operating economies rather than differences in the cost of funds. [Akhavein, Berger and Humphrey, 1997] Siems [1996] found that the greater the overlap in branch networks, the higher the abnormal equity returns in U.S. bank mergers, while no such abnormal returns are associated with other factors like regional concentration ratios -suggesting that shareholder value gains in many of the US banking mergers of the 1990s were associated more with increases in X-efficiency than with reductions in competition. If true, this is good news for smaller firms, since the quality of management seems to be far more important in driving costs than raw size or scope. Of course, if very large institutions are systematically better managed than smaller ones (which may be difficult to document in the real world of financial services) then there may be a link between firm size and X-efficiency.
It is also possible that very large organizations may be more capable of the massive and "lumpy" capital outlays required to install and maintain the most efficient information-technology and transactions-processing infrastructures. [Walter 2003 ] If extremely high recurring technology spend-levels results in greater X-efficiency, then large financial services firms will tend to benefit in competition with smaller ones.
Smaller firms will then have to rely on pooling and outsourcing, if feasible.
In banking M&A studies, Berger and Humphrey [1992b] found that acquiring banks tend to be significantly more efficient than the acquired banks, suggesting that the acquirer may potentially improve the X-efficiency of the target. Akhavein, Berger, and Humphrey [1997] found mega-mergers between US banks increase returns by improving efficiency rather than increasing prices, suggesting also that acquiring banks use acquisitions as an occasion to improve efficiency within their own organizations. Houston and Ryngaert [1994] and DeLong [2001b] found that the market rewards mergers where geographic overlap exists between acquirer and target, presumably due to expected X-efficiency gains.
Revenue Economies of Scope
On the revenue side, economies of scope attributable to cross-selling arise when the all-in cost to the buyer of multiple financial services from a single supplier is less than the cost of purchasing them from separate suppliers. This includes the cost of the services themselves plus information, search, monitoring, contracting and other costs.
And firms that are diversified into several types of activities or several geographic areas in addition tend to have more contact points with clients. Revenue-diseconomies of scope could arise from management complexities and conflicts associated with greater breadth.
Some evidence on revenue economies of scope come from historical studies. Kroszner and Rajan [1994] found that U.S. bank affiliates typically underwrote better performing securities than specialized investment banks during the 1920s, when US commercial banks were permitted to have securities affiliates. Perhaps commercial banks obtained knowledge about firms contemplating selling securities through the deposit and borrowing history of the firm. If so, they could then select the best risks to bring to market. Likewise, Puri [1996] found that securities underwritten by commercial banks generated higher prices than similar securities underwritten by investment banks; this suggests lower ex ante risk for those underwritten by commercial banks.
Most empirical studies of cross-selling are based on survey data, and are therefore difficult to generalize. Regarding wholesale commercial and investment banking services, for example, Exhibit 3 shows the results of a 2001 survey of corporate clients by Greenwich Research regarding the importance of revenue economies of scope between lending and M&A advisory services. The issue is whether companies are more likely to award M&A work to banks that are also willing lenders, or whether the two services are separable -so that companies go to the firms with the perceived best M&A capabilities (probably investment banking houses) for advice and to others (presumably the major commercial banks) for loans. The responses suggests that companies view these services as a single value-chain, so that banks that are willing to provide significant lending are also more likely to obtain M&A advisory work. Indeed, Exhibit 4 suggests that well over half of the major M&A firms (in terms of fees) in 2001
were commercial banks with substantial lending power. This is sometimes called "mixed bundling," meaning that the price of one service (e.g., commercial lending) is dependent on the client also taking another service (e.g., M&A advice or securities underwriting), although the search for immediate scope-driven revenue gains may have led to some disastrous lending by commercial banks in the energy and telecoms sectors in recent years.
However, it is at the retail level that the bulk of the revenue economies of scope are likely to materialize, since the search costs and contracting costs of retail customers are likely to be higher than for corporate customers. There is limited US evidence on retail cross-selling due to the regulatory restraints in place until 1999, and evidence from Europe, where universal banking and multifunctional financial conglomerates have always been part of the landscape, is mainly case-based and suggests highly variable outcomes as to the efficacy of bancassurance or Allfinanz.
In any case, the future may see some very different retail business models. One example is depicted in Exhibit 5. Here clients take advantage of user-friendly home interfaces to access Webservice platforms which allow real-time linkages to multiple financial services vendors. For the client, it could combine the "feel" of single-source purchasing with access to best-in-class vendors -the client "cross-purchases" rather than being "cross-sold." Absent the need for continuous financial advice, such a business model could reduce information costs, transactions costs and contracting costs while at the same time providing client-driven open-architecture access to the universe of competing vendors. Advice could be built into the model by suppliers who find a way to incorporate the advisory function into their downlinks, or through independent financial advisers. If in the future such models of retail financial services delivery take hold in the market, then some of the rationale for cross-selling and revenue economies of scope could become obsolete.
Despite an almost total lack of hard empirical evidence, revenue economies of scope may indeed exist at both the wholesale and retail level. But they are likely to be very specific to the types of services provided and the types of clients served. So revenue-related scope economies are clearly linked to a firm's specific strategic positioning across clients, products and geographies depicted in Exhibit 2. Even if cross-selling potential exists, the devil is in the details -mainly in the design of incentives and organizational structures to ensure that it actually occurs. And these incentives have to be extremely granular and compatible with employee real-world behavior. Without them, no amount of management pressure and exhortation to crosssell is likely to achieve its objectives.
Network economies associated with multifunctional financial firms may be considered a special type of demand-side economy of scope. [Economides, 1995] Like telecom-munications, relationships with end-users of financial services represent a network structure wherein additional client linkages add value to existing clients by increasing the feasibility or reducing the cost of accessing them. So-called "network externalities" tend to increase with the absolute size of the network itself. Every client link to the firm potentially "complements" every other one and potentially adds value through either one-way or two-way exchanges. The size of network benefits depends on technical compatibility and coordination in time and location, which universal banks and financial conglomerates may be in a position to provide. And networks tend to be selfreinforcing in that they require a minimum critical mass and tend to grow in dominance as they increase in size, thus precluding perfect competition in network-driven businesses. This characteristic may be evident in activities such as securities clearance and settlement, global custody, funds transfer and international cash management, and may to lock-in clients insofar as switching-costs tend to be relatively high.
What little empirical evidence there is suggests that revenue-economies of scope seem to exist for specific combinations of products in the realm of commercial and investment banking, as well as insurance and asset management. Empirical evidence concerning the existence of certain product-specific revenue economies of scope is beginning to materialize. For example, Yu [2001] showed that share prices of US 
Market Power
In addition to the strategic search for operating economies and revenue synergies, financial services firms will also seek to dominate markets in order to extract economic returns. This often referred to as economies of "size" as opposed to classic economies of "scale," and can convey distinct competitive advantages that are reflected in either business volume or margins, or both.
Market power allows banks to charge more (monopoly benefits) or pay less (monopsony benefits). Indeed, many national markets for financial services have shown a distinct tendency towards oligopoly. Supporters argue that high levels of market concentration are necessary in order to provide a viable competitive platform. Without convincing evidence of scale economies or other size-related efficiency gains, opponents argue that monopolistic market structures serve mainly to extract rents from consumers or users of financial services and redistribute them to shareholders, crosssubsidize other areas of activity, invest in wasteful projects, or reduce pressures for cost-containment.
Indeed, it is a puzzle why managers of financial services firms often seem to believe that the end-game in their industry's competitive structure is the emergence of a few firms in gentlemanly competition with nice sustainable margins, whereas in the real world such an outcome can easily trigger public policy reaction leading to breaks-ups and spin-offs in order to restore more vigorous competition. Particularly in a critical economic sector that is easily politicized such as financial services, a regulatory response to "excessive" concentration is a virtual certainty despite sometimes furious lobbying to the contrary. In the case of Canada, for example, regulators prevented two megamergers in late 1998 that would have reduced the number of major financial firms from five to three with a retail market share of perhaps 90% between them. Regulators blocked the deals despite arguments by management that major US financial services there has been a long-term erosion of return on capital invested in the wholesale banking industry. [Smith and Walter, 2003] Another example is asset management, where the top firms comprise a mixture of European, American and Japanese asset managers and at the same time a mixture of banks, broker-dealers, independent fund management companies and insurance companies. Although market definitions clearly have to be drawn more precisely, at least on a global level asset management seems to be among the most contestable in the entire financial services industry, with a Herfindahl-Hirshman index of 540 among the top-40 firms in terms of assets under management. And it shows very few signs of increasing concentration in recent years.
In short, although monopoly power created through mergers and acquisitions in the financial services industry can produce market conditions that allow firms to reallocate gains from clients to themselves, such conditions are not easy to achieve or to sustain. Sometimes new players -even relatively small entrants -penetrate the market and destroy oligopolistic pricing structures. Or there are good substitutes available from other types of financial services firms and consumers are willing to shop around. Vigorous competition (and low Herfindahl-Hirshman indexes) seems to be maintained even after intensive M&A activity in most cases as a consequence of relatively even distributions of market shares among the leading firms in many financial services businesses.
Berger and Hannan [1996] found that loan rates were higher and deposit rates were lower when banks operated in concentrated markets. These increased revenues, however, did not result in higher profits -instead, the study showed evidence consistent with higher cost structures in such banks than their counterparts in less concentrated markets. Akhavein, Berger, and Humphrey [1997] found that banks which merge charge more for loans and pay less on deposits before they merge than other large banks --banks that merged charged 17 basis points more for loans than the average large bank prior to merging. After the merger, however, this difference fell to about 10 basis points. This suggests that merging banks do not tend to take advantage of their increased market power. The authors contend that antitrust policy is effective in preventing mergers that would create market power problems. Siems [1996] reached a similar conclusion. In a study of 19 bank megamergers (partners valued over $500 million) in 1995, he rejected the market power hypothesis although he found that inmarket mergers create positive value for both the acquirer and the target upon announcement. There was no relationship between the resulting abnormal returns and the change in the Herfindahl-Hirshman index. Still, concentration seems to affect prices. Beatty, Santomero, and Smirlock [1987] found that the higher the market concentration of the banking industry in a given region, the higher the premium paid to acquire a bank in that area.
Proprietary Information and Imbedded Human Capital
One argument in favor of large, diverse financial services industry is that internal information flows are substantially better and involve lower costs than external information flows in the market that are accessible by more narrowly focused firms.
Consequently a firm that is present in a broad range of financial markets, functions and geographies can find proprietary and client-driven trading and structuring opportunities that smaller and more narrow firms cannot.
A second argument has to do with technical know-how. Significant areas of financial services -particularly wholesale banking and asset management -have become the realm of highly specialized expertise which can be reflected in both market share and price-effects. In recent years, large numbers of financial boutiques have been acquired by major banks, insurance companies, securities firms and asset managers for precisely this purpose, and anecdotal evidence suggests that in many cases these acquisitions have been shareholder-value enhancing for the buyer.
Closely aligned is the human capital argument. Technical skills and entrepreneurial behavior are embodied in people, and people can and do move. Parts of the financial services industry have become notorious for the mobility of talent to the point of "free-agency," and people or teams of people sometimes regard themselves as "firms within firms." There are no empirical studies of these issues, although there is no question about their importance. Many financial services represent specialist businesses that are conducted by specialists meeting specialist client requirements.
Knowhow embodied in people is clearly mobile, and the key is to provide a platform that is sufficiently incentive compatible to make the most of it. It seems unclear whether size or breadth has much to do with this.
Diversification of Business Streams, Credit Quality and Financial Stability
Greater diversification of earnings attributable to multiple products, client-groups and geographies is often deemed to create more stable, safer, and ultimately more valuable financial institutions. The lower the correlations among the cash flows from the firm's various activities, the greater the benefits of diversification. The consequences should include higher credit quality and higher debt ratings (lower bankruptcy risk), therefore lower costs of financing than those faced by narrower, more focused firms, while greater earnings stability should bolster stock prices. In combination, these effects should reduce the cost of capital and enhance profitability.
It has also been argued that shares of universal banks and financial conglomerates embody substantial franchise value due to their conglomerate nature and importance in national economies. Demsetz, Saidenberg and Strahan [1996] suggest this guaranteed franchise value serves to inhibit extraordinary risk-taking. They find substantial evidence that the higher a bank's franchise value, the more prudent management tends to be. Such firms should therefore serve shareholder interests, as well as stability of the financial system -and the concerns of its regulators -with a strong focus on risk management, as opposed to financial firms with little to lose. This conclusion is, however, at variance with the observed, massive losses incurred by financial conglomerates universal banks in recent years in credit exposures to highly leveraged firms and special-purpose entities, real estate lending and emerging market transactions.
Studies that test risk reduction often look at how hypothetical combinations could have reduced risk using actual industry data. In an early study, Santomero and Chung [1992] found that bank holding companies which existed from 1985 to 1989 could have reduced their probability of failure had they been permitted to diversify into insurance and securities. Of the ten combinations the authors examined, the best combination is the bank holding company linking to both insurance and securities firms. The only combination that would have increased the probability of bankruptcy over a stand-alone bank holding company is one encompassing a large securities firm. Boyd, Graham, and Hewitt [1993] tested whether hypothetical mergers between bank holding companies and non-banking financial firms decrease risk. In their sample of data from 1971 to 1987, they found that mergers between bank holding companies and insurance firms could have reduced risk while mergers between bank holding companies and securities firms or real estate firms could have increased risk. Saunders and Walter [1994] carried out a series of simulated mergers between US banks, securities firms and insurance companies in order to test the stability of earnings of the pro-forma "merged" firm as opposed to separate institutions. The opportunity-set of potential mergers between existing firms and the risk-characteristics of each possible combination were examined.
The findings suggest that there are indeed potential risk-reduction gains from diversification in multi-activity financial services organizations, and that these increase with the number of activities undertaken. The main risk-reduction gains appear to arise from combining commercial banking with insurance activities, rather than with securities activities.
Too Big to Fail Guarantees
Given the unacceptable systemic consequences of institutional collapse, large financial services firms that surpass a given threshold will be bailed-out by taxpayers. In the United States, this policy became explicit in 1984 when the Comptroller of the Currency testified to Congress that 11 banks were so important that they would not be permitted to fail. [O'Hara and Shaw, 1990] It was clearly present in the savings and loan collapses around that time. In other countries the same policy tends to exist, and seems to cover even more of the local financial system. [US General Accounting Office, 1991] There were numerous examples in France, Switzerland, Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Japan during the1990s. Implicit too-big-to-fail (TBTF) guarantees create a potentially important public subsidy for major financial firms. It is generally accepted that the larger the bank, the more likely it is to be covered under TBTF support. O'Hara and Shaw [1990] detailed the benefits of TBTF status:
Without state assurances, uninsured depositors and other liability holders demand a risk premium. When a bank is not permitted to fail, the risk premium is no longer necessary.
Furthermore, banks covered under the policy have an incentive to increase their risk in order to enjoy higher equity returns. Kane [2000] investigated the possibility that large banks enjoy access to the TBTF guarantees in a study of merger-effects, although he did not distinguish between the stock market reaction to increased TBTF guarantees or the likelihood of increased profitability. He suggested further study to determine whether acquiring banks increase their leverage, uninsured liabilities, non-performing loans and other risk exposures, all of which would suggest that they are taking advantage of TBTF guarantees.
One problem with the TBTF argument is to determine precisely when a financial institution becomes too big to fail. Citicorp was already the largest bank holding company in the United States before it merged with Travelers in 1998. Therefore, the TBTF argument may be a matter of degree. That is, the benefits of becoming larger may be marginal if a firm already enjoys TBTF status.
Conflicts of Interest
The potential for conflicts of interest is endemic in all multifunctional financial services firms. [Saunders and Walter,1994 ] Classic conflict of interest arguments include the following: (1) When firms have the power to sell affiliates' products, managers may no longer dispense "dispassionate" advice to clients and have a salesman's stake in pushing "house" products, possibly to the disadvantage of the customer; (2) A financial firm that is acting as an underwriter and is unable to place the securities in a public offering may seek limit losses by "stuffing" unwanted securities into accounts over which it has discretionary authority; (3) A bank with a loan outstanding to a client whose bankruptcy risk has increased, to the private knowledge of the banker, may have an incentive to encourage the borrower to issue bonds or equities to the general public, with the proceeds used to pay-down the bank loan; Conflicts of interest can also impede market performance. For example, inside information accessible to a bank as lender to a target firm would almost certainly prevent that bank from acting as an M&A adviser to a potential acquirer. Entrepreneurs may not want their private banking affairs handled by a bank that also controls their business financing. A mutual fund investor is unlikely to have easy access to the full menu of available equity funds though a financial conglomerate offering competing inhouse products. These issues may be manageable if most of the competition is coming from other financial conglomerates. But if the playing field is also populated by aggressive insurance companies, independent broker-dealers, fund managers and other specialists, these issues tend to be a continuing strategic challenge for management (and a source of comfort for clients).
Should a major conflict of interest arise, the repercussions for a firm's reputation can be quite detrimental. 
Conglomerate Discount
It is often argued that the shares of multi-product firms and business conglomerates tend to trade at prices lower than shares of more narrowly-focused firms (all else equal). There are two basic reasons why this "conglomerate discount" is alleged to exist.
First, it is argued that, on the whole, conglomerates tend to use capital inefficiently. It is argued that the potential benefits of diversification against the potential costs that include greater management discretion to engage in value-reducing projects, cross-subsidization of marginal or loss-making projects that drain resources from healthy businesses, misalignments in incentives between central and divisional managers, and the like. For a sample of U.S. corporations during the period 1986-91, Berger and Ofek [1995] demonstrated an average value-loss in multi-product firms on the order of 13-15%, as compared to the stand-alone values of the constituent businesses. The bulk of value-erosion in conglomerates was attributed by the authors to over-investment in marginally profitable activities and cross-subsidization. This valueloss was smaller in cases where the multi-product firms were active in closely-allied activities within the same industrial sector. In other empirical work, John and Ofek [1995] showed that asset sales by corporations result in significantly improved shareholder returns on the remaining capital employed, both as a result of greater focus in the enterprise and value-gains through high prices paid by asset buyers. The evidence suggests that the internal capital market within conglomerates functions less efficiently than the external capital market.
Such empirical findings across broad ranges of industry may well apply to diverse activities carried out by financial firms as well. If retail banking and wholesale banking and P&C insurance are evolving into highly-specialized, performance-driven businesses, for example, one may ask whether the kinds of conglomerate discounts found in industrial firms may not also apply to financial conglomerate structures --especially if centralized decision-making is becoming increasingly irrelevant to the requirements of the specific businesses.
A second possible source of a possible conglomerate discount is that investors in shares of conglomerates find it difficult to "take a view" and add pure sectoral exposures to their portfolios. Investors may want to avoid such stocks in their efforts to construct efficient asset-allocation profiles. This is especially true of performance-driven managers of institutional equity portfolios who are under pressure to outperform cohorts or equity indexes. Why would a fund manager want to invest in yet another (closed-end) fund in the form of a conglomerate -one that may be active in retail banking, wholesale commercial banking, middle-market lending private banking, corporate finance, trading, investment banking, asset management insurance and perhaps other businesses as well?
Both the capital-misallocation effect and the portfolio-selection effect may weaken investor demand for shares of universal banks and financial conglomerates, lower their equity prices, and produce a higher cost of capital than if the conglomerate discount were absent. This higher cost of capital would have a bearing on the competitive performance and profitability of the enterprise. It may wholly or partially offset some of the aforementioned benefits of conglomeration, such as greater stability and lower bankruptcy risk through diversification across business lines.
From Book Value of Equity to Market Value of Equity
From a shareholder perspective, all of the pluses and minuses of size and breadth among financial services firms can be captured in a simple valuation formula:
NPV f denotes the risk-adjusted discounted present value of a firm's after-tax earnings, E(R t ) a represents the expected future revenues of the firm, E(C t ) represents expected future operating costs including charges to earnings for restructurings, loss provisions and taxes. The net expected returns in the numerator are then discounted to the present using a risk-free rate i t and a composite risk adjustment α t --which captures the variance of expected net future returns resulting from credit risk, market risk, operational risk, and reputation risk, and at the same time captures the correlations between such risks associated with the firm's various activities.
Strategic initiatives in financial firms increase shareholder value if they generate:
(1) Top-line gains which show up as increases in E(R t ) due for example to marketextension, increased market share, wider profit margins or successful cross-selling; (2) Bottom-line gains related to lower costs due to economies of scale or improved operating efficiency, --reduced E(C t ) --usually reflected in improved cost-to-income ratios, as well as better tax efficiency; or ( When strategic initiatives are undertaken, such as mergers or acquisitions, it is possible to add some empirical content to this kind of construct. In terms of US completed deals during a period of intense M&A activity in the 1980s and early 1990s, commercial bank acquisitions occurred at price-to-book value ratios of about 2.0, sometimes as high as 3.0 or even more. In eight of the eleven years covered by one study [Smith and Walter, 2000] , the mean price-to-book ratio for US commercial banking acquisitions was below 2.0, averaging 1.5 and ranging from 1.1 in 1990 to 1.8 in 1985. In two years, the price-to-book ratio exceeded 2.0 -in 1986 it was 2.8 and in 1993 in was 3.2. These values presumably reflect the opportunity for the acquired institutions to be managed differently and to realize the incremental value needed to reimburse the shareholders of the acquiring institutions for the willingness to pay the premium in the first place. If in fact the potential to capture value for multifunctional financial firms exceeds that for the traditional US-type separated commercial banks reflected in such studies, this should be reflected in higher merger premiums outside the United States as well as within the US after the 1999 liberalization of line-of-business restrictions.
Event study methodology [Brown and Warner, 1985] can also be used to determine investor reaction to events such as the announcement of a presumably value-enhancing merger that adds either size or scope. The technique controls for conditions in the general market and tries determine the relationship that a particular stock has with the market under "normal" conditions --that is, before the event occurs.
This relationship can be established by regressing the returns of the stock on the market index and a constant.
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One then determines what the stock "should" have earned (total return) given the state of the general market as well as the stock's past relationship with that market. These hypothetical returns are compared with actual returns to determine the abnormal returns --that is, how much more or less the stock actually earns as a result of the announcement.
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Abnormal returns are added together over various time periods, usually several days before the announcement to several days after. One needs to look at a few days before the event in case any news about the event has leaked and affected the value of the stock. Looking at the abnormal returns for a few days after the announcement allows one to take "second thoughts" into account. The market may be so surprised by an announcement that the market may need a few days to digest the news. One cannot know for sure the ideal length of the pre-or post-event periods. Extending either period leads to problems, since other events such as earnings reports or changes in management could have occurred and the market could be reacting to them instead of the one being examined.
As an example of how the event study approach can be used, we applied it to the seven strategic M&A deals undertaken by UBS AG and its predecessor organizations That is, AR it = R it -(∀ i + ∃ i R Mt ), where AR it = abnormal return for stock i at time t; R it = return on stock i at time t; and R Mt = the return on the market at time t.
cumulative abnormal returns, while the GAM and PaineWebber deals would have affected the shares of the new UBS AG.
We estimated alpha and beta using daily returns from 500 to 10 days before the merger announcement by regressing the returns of the stock on the returns of the Swiss SMI index. To determine the extent to which a particular merger was perceived by the deal-flow --targets of in-market mergers gain and acquirers do not lose. On the other hand, market reaction to the UBS acquisition of PaineWebber was strongly negative, probably in large part due to the high price paid.
Conclusions
Assessing the potential effects of size and scope in financial services firms is as straightforward in concept as it is difficult to calibrate in practice. The positives include economies of scale, improvements in operating efficiency (including the impact of technology), cost economies of scope, revenue economies of scope, impact on market structure and pricing power, improved financial stability through diversification of revenue streams, improvements in the attraction and retention of human capital, and possibly TBTF support. The negatives include diseconomies of scale, higher operating costs due to increased size and complexity, diseconomies of scope on either the cost or revenue sides (or both), the impact of possible conflicts of interest on the franchise value of the firm, and a possible conglomerate discount in the share price. Bigger and broader is sometimes better, sometimes not. It all depends.
The evidence so far suggests rather limited prospects for firm-wide cost economies of scale and scope among major financial services firms in terms of overall cost structures, although they certainly exist in specific lines of activity. Operating economies (X-efficiency) seems to be the principal determinant of observed differences in cost levels among banks and nonbank financial institutions. Revenue-economies of scope through cross-selling may well exist, but they are likely to apply very differently to specific client segments and product lines. Conflicts of interest can pose major risks for shareholders of multifunctional financial firms, which may materialize in civil or even criminal litigation and losses in franchise value, There is plenty of evidence that diversification across uncorrelated business streams promotes stability, although unexpected correlation spikes (as between insurance and investment banking) may arise from time to time.
Exhibit 9 shows the most valuable financial services in the North America and Europe in terms of market capitalization. Two observations could be made. First, the largest by whatever measures are used in the major industry segments are not necessarily the most valuable. Indeed, rank correlations between size and market value are low. And second, both lists are highly diverse. Generalists and specialists cohabitate at the top of the financial services league tables in both regions of the world.
Both observations suggest that the key is in "how" things are done rather than "what" is done. While the burden of proof tends fall on bigger and broader firms, a few cases like GE Capital Services (a conglomerate within a conglomerate) shows that specialist businesses run by specialists on a highly-rated capital platform --subject to unrelenting pressure to sweat the equity by a demanding corporate owner insisting on market dominance together with benchmark attention of service quality, cost control and risk control, shows that it can be done and that it can be done on a sustained basis.
Although even here the issue of transparency eventually forced a breakup of GE Capital's organizational structure in 2002.
In a way, the absence of clear signs of "strategic dominance" -generalists gaining the upper hand over specialists or the other way round -is encouraging. Any number can play, and there are no magic formulas. The devil remains in the details, and there is a premium on plain old good management. From a systemic perspective as well, diversity in the financial system is probably a good thing, as firms competing across strategic groups as well as within them put a premium on both efficiency in financial allocation and innovation in the evolution of financial products and processes. E xhib it 8 V alua tio n G a ins a nd L o sses A ttrib u tab le to S ize a n S co p e 
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